Double Dividend from Tariff Differentiation of Reforestation Fund by Soedomo, Sudarsono
 Received May 23, 2013/Accepted July 17, 2013
Abstract
*Correspondence author, email: 
Double Dividend from Tariff Differentiation of Reforestation Fund
Sudarsono Soedomo
Department of Forest Management, Faculty of Forestry, Bogor Agricultural University, Academic Ring Road, Campus IPB 
Dramaga, PO Box 168, Bogor 16680, Indonesia
Distortionary levy applied uniformly to all diameter classes of logs from logging natural forest can lead to 
inefficiencies; certain diameter should be left in the field because it is not economical to be used. Win-win or Pareto 
improving solution can be achieved if the government is more flexible. Social welfare is higher because of the waste 
that can be utilized to create employment, production and additional benefits for employers, as well as revenue for 
the state. Even if the levy rates are forced to zero for small-diameter timber, governments is actually not harmed at all 
because from the beginning the government does not get any revenue from small timber that is left in the field as 
waste. In scarcity situations of timber from natural forests, it is desirable if the government is considering 
differentiating charges in order to reduce or possibly eliminate the volume of waste generated by the levy. In general, 
tariff differentiation done in the form of higher tariffs for higher diameter logs. If possible, the lowest diameter limit 
of logs is forced down to its technical limits. That is, the processing tool that will determine how the minimum 
diameter logs can be processed profitably.
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Introduction
Charges against the forest can be used to influence the 
rate of harvesting, harvest acreage, species harvested, and the 
level of timber utilization (Gray 1983). A phenomenon that 
frequently occurs is over-logging in areas that are near or 
easily accessible as a result of the lack of charges reflecting 
differences in stumpage value arising from differences in 
accessibility. Similar findings delivered by Hyde and Sedjo 
(1992) which states that a uniform extraction fee is often 
lower revenues and encourage behavior of harvesting high-
value timber only. Levy taking into account heterogeneity of 
quality wood can be used to suppress the behavior of high-
grading (Paarsch 1993). From the social and the environment 
points of view, many economists agree that forest 
management in Indonesia is the big disaster (Poffenberger 
1997).
Royalties derived from the extraction of natural resources 
is an important source of state revenue. However, the 
structure of the forest royalties could lead to deforestation 
through unsustainable harvesting and focus on high-quality 
timber only (Amacher et al. 2001). Royalty structure also 
affects the efficiency of logs utilization. The low rents 
collected by the government could cause logging profit 
becomes so high that encourages excessive investment 
(World Bank 2004).
According to its effect, taxes or any other levies imposed 
by the government can be grouped into 2 categories, namely 
taxes or levies that are distortionary and taxes or levies that 
are not distortionary. Distortionary taxes or levies may affect 
the efficiency of resource allocation, both in positive and 
negative direction. Distortionary taxes or levies having the 
effect of lowering the production is very understandable. But 
if the decline in production increased significantly wasted 
wood unnecessarily, especially in conditions of increasing 
timber scarcity, the distortionary effect needs more serious 
attention. Reforestation fund (DR) and forest resource 
provision (PSDH) are the 2 types of charges in forestry that 
are distortionary.
A uniform rate of DR and PSDH for all diameter classes 
of logs from natural forest causes small diameter logs to 
become inefficient to be used. Log diameter is one of 
heterogeneity elements that has to be considered in 
determining the rates of DR and PSDH. Since the 
Presidential Decree No 40 of 1993 DR rate differentiation 
has occurred, which is based on the areas of production, type 
of wood, and the type of product.
The purpose of this article is to show that the 
differentiation of charges in forestry according to log 
diameter classes potentially increase social welfare and state 
revenue. Increasing state revenues without reducing 
efficiency or even increases it becomes important when it is 
confronted with the fact that the Indonesian government 
received only 17% of the forest rents, whereas from the oil 
the rent collected by the government can reach 85% (Broad 
1995). The review will be limited to DR.  To that end, 
Section 2 will discuss a brief history of the birth of the 
Reforestation Fund. Section 3 deliver economic analysis 
determining the minimum diameter, which is then followed 
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by Section 4 which discusses policy implications. Finally, 
Section 5 is the conclusion.
Short History of Reforestation Fund
When someone is asked “ What is the Reforestation Fund 
or commonly known as DR”? The most likely and the 
quickest move are to recall the definition of DR in Regulation 
6 of 2007 which states that the DR is a fund collected from 
IUPHHK holders in natural production forest to reforest and 
rehabilitate forests.  No matter how ridiculous the definition 
of DR is, but all parties must follow the official and legal 
definition of it.  Being amused is just personal affairs, but 
obeying the laws and regulations is closely related to the 
public interest.  When the questions are continued, what does 
DR actually reflect? The answer to this question has begun to 
diverge. Amplified with the question “is it true if DR is 
treated as non-tax state revenues (PNBP)?”, then the debate 
will be lively.
Senior foresters, the ones who graduated from Indonesian 
schools of forestry prior to 1990 usually working as 
government officials, comprehend DR as metamorphose of 
(Dana Jaminan Reboisasi) (Reforestation Guarantee Fund). 
From name point of view, both DR and DJR have similarity 
and it is understandable if one sees that the 2 terms have a 
close relation. It is true, the initial money of DR was from the 
money of DJR. DJR was money that belongs to holders of 
forest concession right that must be deposited in the 
government's account as a performance guarantee of 
reforestation of forest area under their concession.
Through the Presidential Decree No 35 of 1980 regarding 
DJR, the holders of forest concession were required to 
deposit money to the government as guarantee for 
performing reforestation on their logged over areas.  As time 
went by, DJR at the hand of the government built up because 
very few holders of forest concession who performed 
reforestation. Furthermore, the government through the 
Presidential Decree No 31 of 1989 regarding DR cancelled 
the Presidential Decree No 35 of 1980 and DJR was changed 
to DR with all consequences.  The Presidential Decree No 31 
of 1989 later on experienced many changes, e.g. through the 
Presidential Decree No 29 of 1990, the Presidential Decree 
No 28 of 1991, the Presidential Decree No 40 of 1993, and 
finally the Presidential Decree No 24 of 1997.
The legal status of the DR from 1989 to 1999 was not 
clear, whether or not it was the state revenue. Logically, state 
revenues are divided out into 2 categories, namely in the form 
of tax revenue and non-tax state revenue or known non-tax 
revenues. During the period 1989 to 1999, DR was clearly 
not a tax nor non-tax revenues because inclusion of DR as a 
non-tax revenues lately occurred through Government 
Regulation No. 92 of 1999.
Large amounts of idle money certainly made many 
government bureaucrats tempt to use it. It follows the 
characteristics of bureaucracy that tends to maximize the 
budget (Niskanen 1968).  To that end, the money must be first 
converted into money that belongs to the state to be used for 
reforestation.  Thoughts like these that gave birth to the 
definition of DR containing high levels of awkwardness as 
set out in Regulation 6 of 2007.  Is DR money only used to 
reforest unproductive forest areas? Public already knew what 
the answer to this question.
But when we look at the substance contained therein, DR 
and DJR has a much different meaning.  DR is not a 
guarantee of performance, while DJR is a guarantee of 
performance.  Act 41 of 1999 through Article 35 clearly 
mandates that every holder of IUPPH is charged with a 
performance bond (DJK).  Is the mandate implemented by 
the Ministry of Forestry? So, in terms of substance, DJR was 
altered to DJK.  Why did the word of “reforestation” more 
evolve into the collective memory than the word of 
“guarantee fund” so that people associated DJR more with 
DR than with DJK? Isn’t “not executing law” a violation of 
the law itself ?
There are 2 important questions related to reforestation.  
First, why did the licensees choose to sacrifice DJR and to 
hand over reforestation obligation to the government? Could 
it be because there is no need to be reforested because the 
licensees have worked with great care? The possibility is 
always there but the chances are too small.  A more plausible 
reason is that the cost of reforestation is actually greater than 
DJR.  Rational entrepreneur will surely give up DJR taken 
by the government in exchange for freedom from the 
obligation to conduct a reforestation. In other words, the 
amount of DJR set the government did not meet the 
participation constraint (see Laffont & Martimort 2002). 
Second, if the private sector is not willing to carry out 
reforestation with risks such as loss of DJR, then by the same 
DJR private sector? Empirical devidence suggesting that 
government bureaucracies tend to be less efficient than 
private bureaucracies, then the answer to this second 
question is likely not possible. As a result, the damaged 
forest area will increase.
Tariff Effect on Minimum Diameter
Under situation of not vertically integrated with timber 
processing industries, the holders of forest concession must 
sell their timber production in free markets.  It is assumed, 
for simplicity of exposition, that the unit price of logs is 
uniform and independent of the diameter, which is uniform 
for all diameter classes.  Meanwhile, the production cost per 
cubic meter of logs decreased with increasing diameter.  The 
intersection of the 2 curves will determine the minimum 
diameter of the logs that can be processed economically 
(Figure 1).  The curve of the production cost per cubic meter 
of log without charges, DR, for example, is represented by 
the lower curve.  This cost curve intersects the curve of the 
log prices at diameter of Ø .  The existence of DR rates of τ
1 1 
per cubic meter makes the cost curve shift upward of τ and 
1 
intersects the curve of log price at the diameter of Ø .  If the 
2
DR rates are higher, such as τ , then the intersection with the 
2
price of logs will occur at a higher diameter, that is, Ø .  The 
3
result will not change if the log price is monotonically 
increasing with the diameter.
If we define the cumulative volume of logs of a certain 
diameter and greater is as follows (Equation [1]). 
   [1]
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applying the Leibniz rule to Equation [1]  yields  (Equation [2]).
[2]
In other words, because 
the minimum diameter of the logs that can be utilized 
economically will increase with the higher tariffs, then the 
cumulative volume of timber that can be utilized becomes 
less. In sum, fees correlate positively with the amount of 
waste. This is consistent with what is given by Karsenty 
(2010) that the fee system can encourage appreciation for the 
resource by reducing waste and increasing the value of the 
product.
Policy Implications
The idea of raising PNBP through increasing DR rates 
uniformly could be counter-productive, in the sense of failing 
to raise non-tax revenues but instead increase logging waste. 
The increase of the DR rates can reduce the volume of timber 
that can be exploited economically. Increasing the minimum 
diameter of logs that can be exploited economically 
implicated in increased waste from logs. Thus, increasing the 
DR rates uniformly with the intention of increasing state 
revenue potentially produces double losses, the decreased 
efficiency of timber utilization and the possibility of 
declining revenues. State revenue from the DR, that is, G, is 
the product of the DR rate and volume of logs utilized. The 
volume of logs that can be used itself depends on the DR rate 
imposed. Thus, the expression for G can be stated as follows 
(Equation [3]).
   [3]
Furthermore, to see the effect of the increase of the DR 
rates on state revenues G can be done by using the following 
derivation (Equation [4]).
   [4]
   
Since then             . 
Theoretically, the value of the Equation [4] can be 
negative, positive, or zero, depending on the DR rates at that 
time. Therefore, increasing DR rates may not necessarily 
result in increased state revenue. Differentiation of DR rates 
could increase state revenues and at the same time could 
increase the efficiency of logs utilization from natural 
forests. Here we get a double benefit, known as double 
dividends. It is similar with the tax assessment of gasoline in 
the US suggested by Glomm et al. ( 2008). Using Figure 2, 
this claim can be shown more easily. By using a single DR 
rate of τ  the smallest diameter of logs that can be used is Ø , 
2 3
so the diameter of logs between Ø  and Ø  is unnecessarily 
1 3
wasted even though technically it is still possible to be 
processed. Logs with a diameter of between Ø  and Ø  will 
1 3
also not provide revenue for the government.
Now assume that the government is doing differentiation 
of DR rates, which is zero for logs with a diameter of 
between Ø  and Ø , τ for logs with a diameter of between Ø  
1 2 1 2
and Ø , and τ  for logs with a diameter of ≥ Ø . This scheme 
3 2 3
will change the curve of production cost per cubic meter of 
logs plus the DR rate of silky smooth passing from top left to 
bottom right to be broken, as indicated by the curve 
connecting the points a, d, b, e, c, and then follows the 
declining curve. In this way, the government will get 
additional revenue of τ [V(Ø ) – V(Ø )]. Logs with a 
1 2  3
diameter of between Ø  and Ø  is no longer allowed to be a 
1 3
waste because it can provide benefits when used. 
As already indicated above, the differentiation of DR 
rates potentially provide win-win solution; concessionary 
holders gain additional benefits, while the government gets 
additional revenue. Theoretically, if the permit holder and 
the government are rational, then the proposed DR payment 
of φ > 0  by the licensee, for logs that have become waste so 
far, will be accepted by the government. Conversely, the 
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Figure 1   Effect of charge rate on the minimum diameter of timber that can be utilized economically.
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initiative may also come from the government by offering 
DR rates for small logs that is lower than the generally 
accepted DR rate.  It is likely that the government’s offer will 
be rejected by the license holders as it is still too high. But the 
government has no rational reason to reject the proposed DR 
rate of φ > 0  because obviously better than not getting any. 
However, with this attitude, it is likely that timber which 
actually can produce higher-value products will be used as 
raw materials of lower value products. Things like this are 
also a form of inefficiency that also need to be avoided.
Differentiation of DR rates may also apply to the larger 
diameter. The point remains the same, i.e. the larger the 
timber the greater the diameter of the rent can be milked from 
them without causing inefficiency.  Here win-win solution is 
not valid, but win-lose solution because of the increased 
revenue to the government is exactly the same as the 
reduction in profit from the license holder.  However, in the 
public interest, the increase in levy rates for large diameter 
timber can be justified to the extent not kill the businesses 
who hold license.
Differentiation of the DR rates on logs from natural 
forests will add bureaucratic jobs, such as to check the 
production, which implies rising cost of bureaucracy. As 
pointed out by Posner (1975) and Leeson and Sobel (2008), 
first-degree price discrimination may lead to inefficiencies 
since implementing price discrimination raises the costs that 
are high as well. To avoid confusion, the differentiation and 
price discrimination charges have the same effect.
The most probable reaction of DR payer in response to 
tariff differentiation is to lower timber volume of large 
diameter and to increase timber volume of small diameter - 
skewing behavior (Athey & Levin 2001). By doing this, the 
same volume of timber will be charged with a lower DR so 
that it is detrimental to the state. To suppress the skewing 
behavior requires supervision by a bureaucracy which, of 
course, has implications for the increasing needs of the 
budget. Not to mention the possibility of collusion between 
the licensee and the government bureaucrats who carry out 
surveillance to obtain rents (Amacher 2006).
One approach to suppress skewing behavior and 
swelling budget to support the work of the bureaucracy is to 
carry out the classification of the structure of production, ie, 
the distribution of timber volumes by diameter class. By 
knowing the relationship between the structure of 
production with forest stand characteristics, the structure of 
production can be used as general guidelines in determining 
the amount of the DR to be paid for a particular harvest area. 
Collaborative research between expert interpretation of 
Landsat imagery and ecologists are very helpful in 
determining the relationship between forest stand 
characteristics and the structure of production.
In substance, the DR is not a continuation of the DJR. 
Continuation of DJR is substantially Performance 
Guarantee Fund, which has so far not been collected by the 
government. It is true, the conversion of a DR DJR has 
occurred.  Relationship between the 2 stop there.  DR rate 
determines the minimum diameter logs economical for use 
with positive correlation.  Thus, an increase in DR rates 
uniformly on natural forest logs potentially produces more 
waste. Differentiation of DR rates on natural forest logs can 
improve the efficiency of timber utilization and increase 
state revenues - double dividend.
Recommendation
Policy assumptions of timber legality in private forests 
need to be re-examined, so that the gap between the texts of 
the legislation can be implemented based on the realities on 
the ground.
Conclusion
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Figure 2  Effect of reforestasi fund (DR) tariff differentiation on efficiency of log utilization.
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